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VI. THE ROLE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICINE AND THE
BAKARANIA DECISION

TIM RAVICH: [...] The next segment is entitled "The Role of the Florida
Board of Medicine and the Bakaraniadecision." And [our panelists] will
explain the terms in that title [...]. Let me introduce the panel from left to
right.
We will start with ALBERTO HERNANDEZ seated closest to me. Mr.
Hernandez is a shareholder in the Miami office of Greenberg, Traurig. Mr.
Hernandez graduated from the University of Miami School of Law and
focuses his practice on health care transactions, as well as corporate and
regulatory matters. He represents physician practice management companies,
hospitals, health maintenance organizations, outpatient treatment facilities,
integrated health care delivery systems, long term health care facilities,
physicians and other health care providers.
Bob Pupo began his
To Mr. Hemandez's left is ROBERTO PUPO. [...]
legal career with Greenberg, Traurig in 1992 [and works] in the firm's health
department. His practice concentrates on corporate and regulatory matters
relating to health care providers, including physician practice management
companies, hospitals, HMOs, integrated delivery systems and other managed
care entities. Bob has had extensive experience in the representation of
publicly traded and privately held physician practice management companies.
Serving as both transactional and regulatory counsel in a wide range of
matters involving individual physicians, physician groups and physician
networks, Bob also concentrates on the representation of hospitals including
numerous not-for-profit entities, HMOs, integrated delivery systems and other
managed care entities. Bob received his law degree from Harvard Law School
in 1992 and a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown
University in 1989 graduating magna cum laude. In law school Bob was a
member of the HarvardJournalof Law andPublic Policy and helped prepare
the 1991 supplement to Fundamentals of Securities Regulations. We are
[delighted] to have you with us ...thank you.
To Robert's left is MARSHALL BURACK a shareholder in the Miami firm
at Akerman Senterfitt & Eidson. Mr. Burack [did his] undergraduate [study
at] Princeton University and graduated magna cum laude, and then went to
Harvard Law School. Mr. Burack represents physicians, ambulatory surgery
centers, pharmacies, and imaging centers. He has written numerous articles
and presented at numerous seminars. Mr. Burack's reputation in the legal
community is such that he was among the first group of practitioners I
contacted and was encouraged to contact when arranging this Symposium.
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Next is DAVID WINKER. Dave Winker is an associate in the health law
department of McDermott Will & Emery's Miami office. Dave's practice
concentrates on counseling providers with third party payors and on
transactional and regulatory matters in the health law field. This
representation has included federal and state regulatory matters including antikick back and self-referral laws and federal and state reimbursement
programs. He has represented clients in criminal and civil investigations and
reimbursement litigation. Mr. Winker is admitted to the Florida, Georgia, and
District of Columbia Bars. He received his law degree with honors from the
University of Florida in 1994. I gladly turn the forum over to all of you.
Good afternoon. My name is David Winker and I wanted
to talk about the way we are going to conduct the panel today. I am going to
begin by giving you a little bit of background on the fee splitting statute in the
state of Florida. It's a statute that has had a great impact on structuring deals
in this state. We have a very active Board of Medicine. I will speak to some
of those terms. Robert [Pupo] will then talk about the Bakaraniadecision and
also give us some background as to why we are even talking about
Bakarania.' We know that the decision is before [Florida's] first district court
of appeal, - the end of this month, actually the end of next month, the
decision will be made as to whether that's upheld.2 A lot of people are
wondering whether it's still relevant.
The P[hysician] P[ractice]
M[anagement] ("PPM") industry has been in a bit of a retreat and is reforming
itself. [... ] - The question as to the relevance of the Bakaraniadecision to
that retrenchment. Next Marshall [Burack] will speak to trying to get a kind
of- get a synthesis of some board decisions, - looking at this body and how
they are making decisions and they are looking for some trends in what's
going on. And finally Al [Hernandez] will speak to what do we do after
Bakarania, where do we go from here, what's going on with fee-splitting
statutes, how we are structuring deals.
I think I'll start by saying I'm a health care attorney. When people ask me
what that is, I begin by saying health care is one of the most regulated
industries in this country. Otherwise economically or commercially
reasonable activities are restricted in this industry. The idea [of] anti-kickback
and self referral is foreign in most industries. If they are still listening, - I
talk about kind of going on how we attempt to structure transactions within
that. One of the things that recently people discovered: physicians are
DAVID WINKER:

I

InRe: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of Magan L Bakarania, M.D., 20 FALR 395 (Fla.
Bd. of Medicine 1997).
2

Subsequent to this Symposium and during publication, such decision was, in fact, upheld. See

Phymatrix Management Co. Inc. v. Bakarania, 24 Fla. L. Weekly, D1500 (Fla. 1st DCA June 25, 1999).
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economically rational actors. Their decisions are affected by economics. The
first time people actually focused on this was, actually, in Florida - looking
at referral rates for, I can't remember the industry, but I think it was clinical
labs - looking at utilization rates for labs that physicians owned. It was
something like [physicians were] 80% more likely to refer to labs they owned
than to a lab they don't own. That was the genesis of a lot of activity in this
area, a lot of regulation.
Why Bakaraniadecision and fee-splitting? The reason people split fees
is that a lot of these arrangements align the incentives of the parties. So at the
margin, when Dave Winker makes the decision as to whether to refer the
patient, - if I'm going to get a certain amount of that money it may affect my
decision and it aligns my incentives to both - perhaps make that referral or
engage in that conduct and in many cases reduce the cost. The PPM industry
really picked up on this and I think another example of this is capitation.
Where you down risk, you take risks on a pool of patients and you have every
incentive at that point to efficiently deliver care and to reduce cost.
The statute in Florida is a fee splitting statute.3 This statute is
approximately 20 years old at this point. It was put into place long before
PPMs came along, long before managed care was on the scene. The statute
provides that... "... paying, receiving any commission, bonus, kickback, or
rebate, or engaging in any split fee arrangement in any form whatsoever with
a physician [.. .] either directly or indirectly for patients referred." That's the
language we are dealing with. Most states have these prohibitions. They're
incredibly broad. It's almost like the antitrust statute; [for] any contract is a
detriment of free trade. You are restricting people's choices. The point of [.
.] concern is, - it's like a speeding law, [in that it may be or] is selectively
enforced. If everyone is breaking the law, then certain enforcement decisions
have to be made. That's what we are going to talk about today.
The Board of Medicine has, in my personal opinion, selectively enforced
this statute. In this area, when you have uneven enforcement, I think, hand-in
hand with that goes uneven reasoning. In the outline I wrote [an] articulation
of reasoning in the event of enforcement is hard to find and when found,
unclear. I think in a couple of the cases I'm going to go through to introduce
the Bakaraniacase you will see that. What we are talking about is the Board
of Medicine's ability to declare choice statements under Florida law;
administrative boards can render statements to parties, who are engaging in an
activity, on the legality of the arrangement. There are a number of decisions
that led up to the Bakarania decision which essentially prohibit certain

3

FLA. STAT. §458.331 (1999)
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percentage-based management arrangements. I'm going to go through just a
couple of them.
I'm going to start with the Lundy4 case. The Lundy case was a 1987
decision - so almost 11 years before Bakarania - where the Board
approved an arrangement which is very similar to modem PPM arrangements.
It was a turn-key management operation. Basically all the doctor had to do
was show up at his office. The staff was there, the equipment was leased, the
energy was on, and everything was ready to go. And it also included
marketing. The quote from the final order in the Lundy case was that "the
corporation would also provide advertising for the facility including but not
necessarily limited to newspaper, radio and television advertising." The
corporation then would split the fee 60% - 40% with the practice. The Board
declared this was not a violation of the fee splitting statute. We went along
for three years under that.
And in a case called Zeterburg,5 the Board objected to a contractual
arrangement that provided for a physician to split practice revenues with a
management company. But in this case there is a twist. The management
company was required to develop a referral network. What the management
company was required to do was setup a circuit of clinics where this guy
would go to each place the patients would be there; he would see them and get
a percentage. The court in that case said "No, we are not comfortable with
this split. The development of a referral network we believe is a split fee
arrangement." Now, the difficulty and the importance of the Board of
Medicine, - and I think one of the things Marshall [Burack] is going to talk
to you about more, - is how there's no reasoning behind this; they basically
said this [is the way it was, in] a one paragraph order.
The next case we have is Speiller.6 In Speiller the Board considered a
petition of a physician who owned a multispecialist clinic. He wanted to
avoid employing physicians. He wanted to have [an] independent contractor
arrangement with these physicians to come in. He would basically provide the
same thing, a turn-key arrangement. The doctors would show up, see the
patient and they would split the fee. Basically he would be paid a flat fee for
the services he performed. The Board looked to Lundy and distinguished the
case and said that you could not keep a portion of the fees. What's so amazing
about this decision is that it goes to, I think, a kind of fundamental, - like

4
In Re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of Edmond G. Lundy, M.D., 9 FALR 6289 (Fla.
Bd. of Medicine 1987).
5
In Re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of Joseph M. Zeterberg, M.D., 12 FALR 1035
(Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1990).
6
In Re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of Paul B. Speiller, M.D., P.A. d/b/a Multi
Specialists of Deerfield, 14 FALR 3942 (Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1992).
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those of us that work in a law firm; we are employees, obviously, but if you're
an independent contractor the incentives of [my engaging] you at a certain
cost and [taking] care of everything else [so that you just] do this service,
many people did not think this was a split fee service.
Finally, leading up to Robert's talk I want talk about the corporate practice
of medicine in Florida. Florida is a state that does not prohibit the
employment of physicians. And that is firmly established under Florida law.
The Board does regulate the way that you can compensate a physician pretty
closely. What type of incentive package you can give, etc. But they do allow
the corporate practice of medicine and with that I'm going to turn it over to
Robert to talk about the Bakaraniadecision.
ROBERTO R. Pupo:

Thanks. Some of the cases David [Winker] mentioned
created a regulatory setting in Florida. Those cases and other decisions by the
Board of Medicine created a regulatory setting where percentage fee
arrangements were commonplace and although no practitioner would tell his
client that a percentage fee arrangement was entirely without risk, they were
common industry practice in the state of Florida. This could change and has
been affective in the interim while the Bakaraniadecision is still out there and
could change permanently depending on what happens when the oral
arguments are decided on the Bakaraniamatter.
The decision came about upon the filing of a petition for declaratory
statement by Megan Bakarania. The doctor sought a determination from the
Board of Medicine on the bases of his stated intent to join a medical group
practice in Tampa, Florida. That practice was being managed by a Physician
Practice Management company (a "PPM") - actually it was the Phymatrix
Management Company - that was the manager for that practice. As stated
in the petition, the doctor sought the determination because he was going to
be part of the practice and was asked to join this agreement. The agreement
was rather typical in the industry in terms of offering comprehensive
management services to the practice. The services included office equipment,
included personnel, included a series of other office management services
including billing and collection services. More importantly, for purposes of
the Board decision, the contract included a series of contracting services,
which included among that category the establishment of relationships with
managed care entities with provider networks. This was contained in this
agreement; it is the type of provision that is commonplace. It's more than just
commonplace - it was part of the selling point or part of the attraction that
these type of arrangements have with doctors.
With the wave of managed care, and I think in talking to panel members,
and I think we all agree, - that managed care is really the most important
health care issue that we're tackling now in the health care industry. In order
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to remain competitive in this new wave of managed care, doctors felt that,
many of them anyway, -that joined these types of arrangements felt that they
needed professional help. And this is the type of assistance, not just
establishing the contract, evaluating them and negotiating these contracts that
doctors have sought and it's been, like I said, one of the principle reasons why
doctors joined into these types of arrangements. Now, in return for these
services that are being provided, this agreement in particular included three
forms of compensation, or three types of fees that were being paid. The first
fee was the basic pass-through fee where cost of the manager would be
reimbursed. The second fee was a general fee, it was a flat fee, in this
particular case it was $450,000 a year that the practice would pay. Finally,
and what caught the Board's attention was the performance fee which was a
30% fee based on net income, on an historical net income of the practice once
the practice net income reached a certain threshold - this fee would kick in.
On the bases of these facts, combining the level of comprehensive services
and the fees, the Board determined that the arrangement violated the fee
splitting statute. It did so on two separate bases. The first, the Board declared
that the net income percentage fee violated the statute because it did not
reflect the cost of services being provided. In this ruling, the Board relied on
the prior Board decision in the Green Clinic7 . I will talk about the
applicability of the Green Clinic in a few seconds. The second bases for the
decision was that the percentage fee arrangement combined with services that
would enhance the practice also resulted in a fee split. In this regard the
Board determined that the activities of the practice management company in
obtaining managed care, contracts for the practice could result in the practice
compensating the management company for these referrals that are being
brought in to the practice pursuant to the managed care agreements.
Now, I think it was the second prong of the decision that has caught
everyone's attention and why this has been such a controversial determination
in Florida. The reason for that is twofold. I think that the Board in so ruling
redefined what the concept of "referral" for purposes of the fee splitting
statute, that's number one. The second is that determination doesn't seem to
fit in within Florida's corporate practice determination. In other words, the
application of the corporate practice of medicine, here, doesn't seem to be
consistent with the Board determination.
First, with the particular concept of referral, traditionally the Board had
held that there needed to be a close nexus between the making of the referral
and the payment for the making of that referral. There had been a case,

In Re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of Gary R. Johnson and the Green Clinic, 14
FALR 3935 (Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1992).
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PracticeManagement Associates, Inc. v. Orman,8 out of [Florida's] second
district court of appeals that basically adopted this traditional definition of
referrals. This definition was subsequently also adopted by the Board. In one
of the more recent decisions this definition was adopted in the Board
determination in [In Re: The PetitionforDeclaratoryStatement of George G.1
Levy[, M.D.]. 9 And this determination again, established a close nexus. The
decision in Orman provided two examples. One of those examples is a fee
earned by a specialist - was being divided with the referring physician that
sent the patient over to the specialist. Another example provided in Orman
was that the doctor that treated the patient and received a fee from the patient
or through the patient's insurer, which split the fee with the sender of that
patient with whoever sent that patient to the doctor.
Again the new concept the Board introduced here was that there was no
such nexus between the practice in the Bakaraniacase and the manager. The
manager's activities simply resulted in additional contracts, managed care
contracts, or could result in additional contracts for the practice. The
management company had no control over the patient, over the third party that
might have assigned the patient to the practice - certainly had no control
over what doctor the patient selected. Still, despite this factual background
the Board ruled that there was sufficient nexus for the establishment of this
relationship to constitute a referral and a fee split for that patient being sent
to that practice. Now what the impact to this is, with respect to managed care,
is the Board delving into the managed care arena. The eventual impact at this
point and time is rather uncertain and is certainly open to discussion and I'm
sure will be addressed depending on what happens with the Bakarania
decision. What the most immediate impact is, is that it's probably going to
restrict the ability of the physician to establish these types of relationships or,
at least obtain, the assistance of a third party manager in connection with
establishment of these relationships.
Now with respect to the corporate practice - the impact that the decision
has had, as David [Winker] mentioned, in Florida, - it is well established a
non-physician can employ other physicians and basically run [.. .] business
on that bases. In that regard anyone sitting in this panel - a non-doctor can
go out and hire a doctor [and] make money, make a profit derived by the fees
generated by that doctor. It would be perfectly legal in this state. It's legal in
other states but that's not the law here. This is something that has caught
everyone's attention because the structure in that scenario is not substantially
different from the structure that was created and had been so often created in
Practice Management Associates, Inc. v. Orman, 614 So.2d 1135 (Fa. 2d DCA 1993).
In Re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of George G. Levy, M.D., Unpublished Final
Order,97-0495 (Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1997).
s

9
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the state of Florida in connection with these practice management
arrangements. So .... since there is a certain importance given to the form
and not as much as the substance of these relationships, the interesting
question that this raises, and it's a question that right now there's no answer
to is whether this decision indicates that the Board might embark on a new
direction with the respect to the corporate practice of medicine and whether
it's going to look closely at arrangements that seem to resemble the
employment of doctors by non-physicians and challenge those arrangements.
Now as I said previously the other prong of the Bakaraniadecision relied
on the Green Clinic. And among the reasons why the Bakarania decision
established new law in Florida, at least that would certainly be the opinion of
many observers of the Board of Medicine decisions, is that the Green Clinic,
in most people's eyes, was the typical fee split case. There, you had a
cardiologist that was providing service to various patients. Those patients
were being referred to the cardiologist by other primary care doctors that were
members of the Green Clinic. In return for these referrals the cardiologist
agreed to pay a certain percentage over to the Green Clinic. In this situation,
unlike the situation in the Bakarania case there was a very direct nexus
between the referral and the payment for that referral - again one of the
several reasons why Bakaraniahas been so controversial in the state.
With that, I'll end my portion of the presentation, - only to say we will
be keenly attuned to what [Florida's] first district court of appeal have to say
about Bakarania.
What I would like to do in the few minutes allotted
to me is try to put the Bakarania decision into an economic and political
context and also talk about the Board of Medicine's decision-making process
and how some of these decisions come to be made. In the next panel, you'll
be hearing a little bit more about the physician practice management industry
as a whole. And I'm sure they'll be telling you about some of the problems
that that industry is experiencing. But in 1997, when the Bakaraniadecision
was handed down, the practice management industry was in much better shape
than it is in today. Publicly-held PPM companies were favorites of Wall
Street. Their stocks enjoyed high multiples. The companies were growing
quickly. They were acquiring practices quickly. Physicians looked to PPM
companies to help them in their struggle against the managed care companies
and the physicians were in many cases happy to sell their practices and take
the cash and the potentially valuable securities that were offered by the PPM
companies. Then comes the Bakaraniadecision in Florida declaring illegal
certain of these physician practice management contracts, and it really threw
a speed bump into the highway of PPM growth.
MARSHALL BURACK:
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But the Bakaraniadecision was more than just an impediment to the PPM
industry. I see the Board's decision in Bakaraniaas a good example of the
tension that exists between the development of new and inventive ways to
structure the delivery of health care services in a very rapidly changing health
care industry, that's on the one hand. And then, on the other hand, you have
the old way of doing things with certain established prohibitions, including the
prohibition against fee splitting, which we have heard about. Bakaraniawas
one of just several recent decisions made by the Board of Medicine which
exemplify this tension. And before discussing just two of those other
decisions I want to give you a little background on the Board of Medicine,
which will help you understand how these decisions are made.
The Board of Medicine is one of several regulatory boards that are now
within the Department of Health. The Board of Medicine obviously is
responsible for regulating the practice of medicine. It consists of fifteen
members, twelve of whom must be licensed physicians. This is important.
This is a physician board. The members of the Board are appointed by the
Governor. As you might imagine, most of [the] physicians who are appointed
to this board by the Governor are probably older, they are prominent, they're
probably very successful, and they probably have been successful under the
old way medicine was practiced, because medicine is changing very rapidly
and these physicians are probably more conservative than younger physicians.
One of the principal functions of the Board of Medicine, we heard about
earlier, is to review complaints regarding malpractice.'" They also make
determinations with regard to other violations of [Florida's] Medical Practice
Act." And as a physician board, it is probably reasonably-well qualified to
interpret and enforce the statutes and rules that relate to the clinical practice
of medicine. But the Board of Medicine really has a much broader
jurisdiction. It also interprets statutes and rules that relate to the business of
medicine. And as the business of medicine has changed very rapidly, this
aspect of the Board's function has taken on increasing importance. As a board
of physicians - a board of physicians that are used to more traditional ways
of practicing - I question whether the Board of Medicine is really the most
appropriate entity to deal with the broader economic questions that come up
under the Medical Practice Act. Because they are not now deciding whether
a particular physician has committed malpractice in a particular case, they are
deciding on the future of an entire industry in the Bakaraniacase, - the PPM
industry. They are deciding on the future of managed care in this state which
is the most important medical issue or health care issue facing society. Should

10

See Section IV, Regulation of Health Care Professionals in Florida, supra p. 427.
FLA. STAT. §358, et. seq. (1999).
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we have a board of fifteen people, twelve of whom are physicians appointed
by the Governor, deciding these issues which are probably more appropriately
decided either by legislature or by a court, which is going to take much
broader issues into consideration? So that's the court, if you will, that decided
the Bakaraniacase.
I just want to mention two other orders that were issued by the Board of
Medicine right about the same time [the] Bakaraniacase was issued to show
that there are a number of other nontraditional economic arrangements which
the Board has considered. And in almost every case, they find those
nontraditional arrangements to be in violation of the fee splitting prohibitions.
And I think they go pretty far out of their way to find those arrangements are
violations (of the fee splitting prohibition) or else they find them in violation
without a whole lot of reasoning. One case is a case called In: The Petition
for DeclaratoryStatement ofJeffrey Fernyhough,M.D. 2 that was decided by
the Board the same day Bakaraniadecision came down. In this particular
case, a physician, Dr. Fernyhough, wanted to lease counter space in his office
to a mail order pharmacy. The pharmacy would put in a computer terminal on
the doctor's desk so that the patients, before leaving the office, could order
their prescription drugs and have them delivered mail-order the next day.
They wouldn't have to, they could go to their pharmacy, but that was an
option, that was a convenience to the patient. And it just wasn't just a dumb
ordering terminal on the desk, it was a computer terminal and supposedly
rather sophisticated software, which would assist the physician in determining
whether prescribed medication was appropriate, - determine whether the
medication might cause adverse effects in conjunction with other medicines
that the patient was taking. Presumably this was to increase patient
convenience. The pharmacy said that it would pay rent to the physician for
the counter space it would be occupying. The pharmacy company would
reimburse the doctor for administrative services, which would be performed
by the physician's staff in inputting data into the computer terminal. The
Board refused to accept the physician's assertion that a fair market value rent
for the counter space could even be determined. In a very short opinion, the
Board would simply ruled that this arrangement was [a] way for the pharmacy
company to pay the physician for his referrals of patients for pharmaceuticals.
The other case I want to mention, decided in the same year as Bakarania,
was an order issued by the Board In re: George Levy, MD. 3 This was another
refusal by the Board to accept what I would say is a nontraditional relationship
between physicians. Dr. Levy referred his patients, from time to time, for

12

20 FALR 4381 (Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1997).

13

See supra note 7.
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MRI scans. Generally, if a patient of a physician needs an MRI, the physician
refers the patient to an MRI facility or to a hospital. The patient is scanned at
the MRI machine. The radiologist associated with that facility would read and
interpret the film and will issue his report to the referring physician. Well, Dr.
Levy wanted to provide more expedited service to his patients. He wanted to
hire a radiologist as a part time employee of his practice. So he would send
his patients to an MRI facility and the films would come back to the practice,
and his part- time employee-radiologist would read the film and give an
interpretation. The MRI facility would bill for the technical component only
of the service and Dr. Levy's practice would bill for the professional
component. And Levy proposed to pay his employee radiologist on a fee-perread basis. And naturally, since he is in business to make a profit, as well as
to serve his patients, the amount he was going to pay his radiologist-employee
was less than the amount he was going to bill for the professional services.
That's why people are in business - to take in more revue than expenses.
Well, the Board ruled Levy's retention of any portion of the professional fee
billed by his employee was fee splitting in violation of the statute. And in this
particular case, the Board seems to ignore the employer-employee
relationship, in effect, ruling that a referral from an employer to an employee
of a patient is going to be looked at just as any other referral between two
separate entities. And if there is any compensation going to the party who is
making the referrals, in this case, the spread that is being retained by Levy for
referring a patient to his employee - that's illegal fee splitting in connection
with the referral.
To me, another example of how the Board is stretching the definition of
referral as they did in Bakaraniaand as Robert [Pupo] alluded to, - to come
to a conclusion that these new and innovative ways of structuring the delivery
of health care services are illegal. And although Bakaraniais probably the
most important of the recent decisions dealing with economic issues, it's
really only one of several which I think apply the fee splitting statute
overbroadly and are impeding innovation between participants in the health
care industry. [.. .]
[...] I'm going to briefly talk about what will be
the long-term and short-term implications of Bakarania. For purpose of my
discussion I am going to assume that Bakarania will be upheld in some
fashion by [Florida's] first [district court of appeal]..."
Bakarania probably [has] two different interpretations. The broadest
interpretation of Bakaraniawill be that all percentage arrangements between

ALBERTO HERNANDEZ:

14

See supra note 2.
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a PPMC (a physician practice management company) and physician group
will be seen as a fee split and therefore subject the physician to discipline. I
think that holding will be unlikely. I think the most likely holding under
Bakarania that the first district court of appeal may find is that percentage
arrangements where the PPMC provides practice enhancement activities such
as Robert [Pupo] mentioned, - creation of networks, bringing managed care
contracts, bringing ancillaries into the practices, - those type of activities
will be -and a percentage arrangement will be found to be a fee split [...]
thereby subjecting the physician to possible disciplinary action. Having said
that, - assuming that's the holding, what are the short term implications of
Bakarania? Well, the first one and the obvious one is that the physician and
the PPMC, those want[ing] to stay in the deal are going to come to the table
and try to renegotiate their agreement so they can comply with what may
become Florida law. And although not an easy fix I think there are certain
arrangements that will be able to be entered into by these parties to preserve
the economic viability of the agreement while at the same time maintaining
the relationship. For example, and I will talk a little on this in just a moment,
•.. the state of New York has a flat out bar [against] percentage arrangements
between physicians and PPMCs. However the other short-term implication,
which is probably not as widespread but it's getting all the publicity and all
the notoriety in the industry, is the tool by which physicians may use
Bakaraniato get out of their existing agreements. By having that agreement
declared void, - I mean that's a big topic and there is a lot of debate going
on in the industry about that.
In fact, I think, to a certain degree, we are already feeling the effects of
Bakaraniaon that front. For example, just recently an opthamologist in Pasco
County has filed suit against his physician resource group, PRG to get out of
his contract with PRG, alleging that their arrangement, as in Bakarania,is
against Florida policy and results in the fee split and therefore the
opthamologist is saying, "It's going to subject me to penalties under Florida
law" And it's just not Florida. In North Carolina, for example, MedPartners
is fighting various law suits at various fronts by the physicians who are
unhappy with MedPartners. The arguments being used by the physicians in
North Carolina are similar to Bakarania- that the percentage arrangements
result in fee split under North Carolina law. But also since North Carolina,
unlike Florida, prohibits the corporate practice of medicine, physicians there
are arguing that MedPartners, in its arrangement with its physician, is
engaging in the corporate practice of medicine, - which is somewhat
interesting ... I can see that argument - the fee split argument is a little
easier to understand when you've got a [...] bar on the practice of medicine,
which is heavily regulated.
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The other argument, which I think is an interesting one, - I'm not sure
how good it is - an argument that one of the physician groups has raised
against MedPartners North Carolina [is] that MedPartners, by virtue of
announcing that it is getting out of the physician practice management
industry, [has by] that statement anticipatorily breached its agreement with the
physician group as they've taken the position that MedPartners can't perform
its obligations under the existing agreement if it's getting out of the business.
As I mentioned before, there are certain alternatives to a percentage
arrangement that might be available to restructure some of these deals.
However, percentage range, in my view, is the best way because it aligns the
incentives of the physician with PPMC, but there are certain things you can
do to fix an existing arrangement. One, which is the easiest fix, but not viable
at all, is just have the practice enhancement activities provided by the PPMC
cease. So if you're not providing practice enhancement activities, it's hard to
argue fee split under Florida law, given what I expect will be the Bakarania
holding. However, one of the main reasons physicians come to a PPMC is
exactly for those practice enhancement activities, - managed care contracts,
formation of networks, and ancillaries, and the like. So with that, together
with access to capital, - so I don't think when the physicians come to the
table they're going to be saying, "Don't provide the practice enhancement
activities, just take your fee." The other alternative structure that's been
discussed among some [... ] - we were discussing it the other day at lunch
is restructuring the deal so that the practice enhancement activities are
provided for a flat fee and have the other array of services provided to a
percentage fee. On further reflection, I'm not sure that'll work, although [Dr.]
Eddie Dauer [of] the [Florida] Board of Medicine has expressed previously
that he might see that flying, but I think if the Board of Medicine finally sits
down and thinks about it, it probably won't. The reason I feel it may not is
because, notwithstanding that a physician group is compensating a PPMC on
a flat fee-for-practice enhancement activities, - if the PPMC is receiving a
percentage arrangement on the other end, who's to say that it was not the
practice enhancement activities that were reimbursed in the flat feeresulted
in the increase revenues on the other side? So, long story short, the PPMC
will probably still share in the increased revenues of the practice
notwithstanding that practice enhancement activities have been paid on a flat
fee. Again, so the easiest fix is the flat fee arrangement, whereby the PPMC
is paid X dollars for the life of the agreement and that no percentage
arrangements. Again that is done in some states.
In New York flat fee is pretty common there. There [are] some deviations
from the flat fee arrangement in New York, but by and large it's flat fee. The
problem with that is two-fold. First of all, businessmen on the PPMC side
have a really hard time in establishing a flat fee, - coming up with the true
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value of their management services on a fixed basis, particularly given the
long-term relationships that these PPMCs entered into with the physician
groups. Some of theses relationships are as much as, or are as long as, rather,
forty years. Obviously we can see a businessman's concern saying, "I'm
going to establish my fee today which has to say the same within the forty
years." They are going to struggle with that. Again, there are ways to deal
with that. Like in New York, for example, sometimes what you'll do is you'll
establish a flat fee; and you reconcile that fee on an annual basis taking into
account the services that were provided by the PPMC, the growth of the
practice, the growth of the locations, the number of physicians, and then all
those factors are taken into account when you establish the fee for the
following year. The problem with that is that as a PPMC you're at the beckand-call of the physician to agreeing for a new fee for the upcoming year.
They may never agree to that. The biggest problem with the, - and this
problem is a problem for both parties - is that a flat fee does not align the
economic incentives of the party - meaning that, if I'm a practice
management company and I'm getting paid $100,000 a year for providing
services, what's my incentive to grow the revenue of that practice, if I grow
it by 15%, 20%? I'm still going to be paid the same fee regardless of what
I've done as a manager of the practice. But, on the other side of the coin is
that there's also - the PPMC is not going to really worry too much about
lowering expenses of the practice, again because it's not sharing in any
savings, because its being paid a flat fee. Again, the economic incentives of
the parties are not aligned...
... [T]here's also one other type of fee that can be used, that's been
discussed among health care practitioners is, for example, - this is also
allowed in New York, is to base your fee on a percentage of the operating
costs of the practice. But what I mean by that is if, for example, [you]
establish your fee at 8 to 10 or whatever number, 8 to 10% of the operating
cost of the practice, - but in New York, for example, that's been allowed
because allowing the PPMC to base its value of its service on the expenses
and not the revenues or profits of the physician practice has passed muster
because, again there is not a sharing of the fees between the PPMC and the
physician; - harder if you step back and look at that arrangement, if you're
a physician you're going to say, "Wait a minute, I don't want to compensate
a PPMC as a percentage of my operating costs because what's their incentive
to lower my cost? If they lower my cost, they lower their fees." So again, the
incentives here are not aligned. The PPMCs [are going to] want to increase
[the] cost of the physician practice so it can increase its fee. Not a real viable
option.
I just want to address this. What are long-term implications of
Bakarania? And here I don't want to talk too much, because I'm sure that's
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going to be spoken by Jay [Martus] and Jeff [Cohen] [and Marc Auerbach] in
the next panel.1 5 I don't want to get too much into that, but, one thing that's
been asked of me "Is the PPMC industry gone, is it done?" And my opinion
is absolutely not. I think it's going through some changes. I think some
PPMCs, such as Phymatrix and MedPartners have announced that they're
leaving the industry, but again I think some PPMCs are still thriving. Some
of the single specialties such as Ameripath and Pediatrics are still pretty active
in the acquisition market and we still have pretty active growth patterns. ....
[G]iven the amount of investment that's in the market place by these PPMCs,
it's not going anywhere. It might reconfigure and become a different type of
animal but it's not going away. Now again, the business models might
change. There might be some PPMC's going to more creation of networks,
which are less capital intensive, and managing the risk contracts and not
investing heavily in physician practices. Because again it's not as capital
intensive. But ultimately I think the PPMC industry it's going to be here and
it's here to stay. Again it might reconfigure somewhat.
If nothing else, it's my opinion that Bakarania probably points to the
need, - and this is what Marshall [Burack] was touching upon, - the need
for legislative changes. The biggest problem we have here is that PPMCs are
relatively new animals into the health care market. The PPMCs, together with
managed care, have created relationships that are complex - relationships
that are now created by and among PPMCs, physicians, managed care
organizations, and hospitals are complex and I'm sure were not envisioned or
even considered when the current legislative regulatory structure was
formulated. Again, this goes back, - we're applying traditional fee split
statutes to situations which have changed and are dynamic. And so I believe
the end result will be that there will be legislative changes, there are going to
have to be, that will address some of the unique relations that have be created,
while preserving the economic viability of the parties who are involved in the
health care delivery system. [...].
(From the Audience): Mr. Hernandez, as you started to touch on it, - are
there any organized medicine or in the legal community anything starting to
come together to get these legislative things put through or proposed at this
point that you've heard?
ALBERTO HERNANDEZ: I personally was involved initially, - about a year
ago, in having legislative change enacted to address the Bakaraniacase and
that, at end of the day, the parties that I was involved decided not to go

1s

See Section VII, Physician Practice Management, infra p. 466.
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forward. But, I don't know of any trade associations or the like that have been
actively involved in._
(From the Audience):
ALBERTO HERNANDEZ:

only the Florida Medical Association?

...

Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge

which is interesting and you wonder why.
TIM RAVICH:

(Applause).

Thank you.

-

